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ABSTRACT
The pervasiveness of deep neural networks (DNNs) in
technology, matched with the ubiquity of cloud-based
training and transfer learning, is giving rise to a new
frontier for cybersecurity whereby ‘structural malware’
is manifest as compromised weights and activation
pathways for unsecure DNNs. In particular, DNNs can
be designed to have backdoors in which an adversary
can easily and reliably fool a classifier by adding to
any image a pattern of pixels called a trigger. Since
DNNs are black-box algorithms, it is generally difficult
to detect a backdoor or any other type of structural
malware. To efficiently provide a reliable signal for
the absence/presence of backdoors, we propose a rapid
feature-generation step in which we study how DNNs
respond to noise-infused images with varying noise
intensity. This results in titration curves, which are a
type of ‘fingerprinting’ for DNNs. We find that DNNs
with backdoors are more sensitive to input noise and
respond in a characteristic way that reveals the backdoor
and where it leads (i.e,. its target). Our empirical results
demonstrate that we can accurately detect a backdoor
with high confidence orders-of-magnitude faster than
existing approaches (i.e., seconds versus hours). Our
method also yields a titration-score T γσ ∈ [0,1] that can
automate the detection of compromised DNNs, whereas
existing backdoor-detection strategies are not automated.
Keywords: Deep learning, AI safety, backdoor attacks,
noise response analysis.
1 INTRODUCTION
While deep neural networks (DNNs) are ubiquitous for
many technologies that shape the 21st century, it is
well known that they are susceptible to various forms
of non-robustness and adversarial deception. Among
other things, this gives rise to new fronts for cyber and
∗Equal contribution. Contact: erichson@berkeley.com.
data warfare. Such robustness and related security con-
cerns abound in relation to adversarial attacks [15, 38]
and fairness in machine learning [4, 10]. This poses
an increasing threat as machine learning methods be-
come more integrated into mission-critical technologies,
including driving assistants, face recognition, machine
translation, speech recognition, and robotics.
Recently, so-called backdoor attacks have emerged as
a crucial security risk for certain machine learning appli-
cations [16, 8, 27, 28, 2, 35, 40, 45, 24]. In these cases, an
adversary can modify a DNN’s architecture either by pol-
luting the training data [16, 8] or by changing the model
weights [27, 28], and then return a “backdoored model”
to the user. This threat scenario is plausible, since an
adversary can have full access to a DNN, e.g., if it is out-
sourced for training due to infrastructure availability and
resource costs (both human and computational).
Backdoors are difficult to detect because they are sub-
tle “Trojan” attacks: a backdoored model behaves per-
fectly innocently during inference, except in situations
where it is presented with an input example that contains
a specific trigger, which activates an (unknown) adver-
sarial protocol that can mislead DNN predictions, poten-
tially with severe consequences. In contrast, classical
data-pollution attacks aim to reduce a classifier’s accu-
racy, and the poor performance is more easily detectable.
Thus, it is of great importance to develop fast and reli-
able metrics to detect compromised DNNs that contain
backdoors. While several defense methods have been
proposed [5, 26, 39, 14, 6, 41], all of them have signifi-
cant limitations such as requiring access to labeled data
and/or the triggered training data, having prior knowl-
edge about the trigger, or using massive computational
resources to train DNNs and perform many adversarial
attacks. In contrast, we will present an efficient approach
without such limitations; we detect backdoors and trig-
gers for modern DNNs, including ResNets, in just sec-
onds (as opposed to hours [6, 41]). Moreover, unlike ex-
isting studies on backdoor attacks, our approach yields a
score T γσ ∈ [0,1] that indicates the absence/presence of a
backdoor, which provides a major step toward automat-
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Figure 1: Noise-response analyses for ResNets trained on CIFAR10. (a) Titration analysis reveals that different patterns
for noise-induced misclassifications distinguish baseline and backdoored models. We add noise η with variance σ to an
input image x, and the red and blue curves show the fraction T γσ [see E q. (3)] of noisy images that yield high-confidence
predictions, ||yˆ(x+η)||∞ > γ (i.e., there is an activation in the final layer that is greater than γ ∈ [0,1)). (b) Perturbation
analysis describes how the k-th logit Zk(x,θ) nonlinearly responds to small-intensity input noise that is added to each
image data point xi jc. (Implicit) gradients
∂Zk(x+η ,θ)
∂xi jc
[see Eq. (7)] are computed after adding noise and reveal pixels that
are associated with the trigger.
ing the rapid detection of backdoors (and possibly even
other types of structural malware).
We rapidly detect backdoors without data and without
performing adversarial attacks with an approach that in-
volves studying the nonlinear response of DNNs to noise-
infused images with varying noise intensity σ . Noise-
response analysis is already a widely adopted technique
to probe and characterize the nonlinearity of black-box
dynamical systems [32], and we similarly use it as a
rapid feature-generation, or “fingerprinting,” for DNNs.
Dynamical-systems perspectives have recently provided
fruitful insights to other areas of machine learning and
optimization [42, 30, 18, 31, 13, 33, 1, 12], and we are
unaware of previous work connecting this field to back-
door attacks. We develop two complementary noise-
response analyses to detect a backdoor: titration analysis
(see Fig. 1a and Sec. 3.2) and perturbation analysis (see
Fig. 1b and Sec. 3.3). In Fig. 1a, we present titration
curves that depict a titration score (defined below) ver-
sus noise intensity σ . The curves reveal that backdoored
models respond to noise very differently than baseline
models, which allows us to rapidly detect which models
are compromised. In particular, observe that DNNs with
a backdoor respond much more strongly to noise than
those without them; they are more brittle to noise. More-
over, we observe that a backdoors’ target class k∗ acts
as a “sink” that induces high-confidence, noise-induced
predictions.
In Fig. 1b, we illustrate the sensitivity of neuron acti-
vations in the final layer before softmax (we will further
refer to these as logits) to input noise for each individ-
ual input image pixel. Observe in the third and fourth
columns that the logits are more sensitive to noise for the
pixels associated with a backdoor’s trigger (in this case,
a 3× 3 patch in the lower-right corner). In other words,
neurons in the final layer have a stronger nonlinear re-
sponse to the pixels associated with the trigger.
Here is a summary of our main contributions:
(a) We develop a noise-induced titration procedure
yielding titration curves that provide a fingerprint-
ing for DNNs.
(b) We propose a titration score T γσ to express the risk
for a DNN to have a backdoor, thereby allowing the
automation of backdoor detection.
(c) We develop a perturbation analysis to study how
the output of a DNN nonlinearly responds to small-
intensity input noise.
(d) We propose an implicit gradient map to reveal
which image pixels are associated with a backdoor’s
trigger.
Overall, we present a methodology that accurately de-
tects backdoors for modern DNNs, including ResNets, in
just seconds (as opposed to hours, for other related meth-
ods). Because our aim is to detect backdoors, as opposed
to design them, we focus our attention on backdoor at-
tacks that have been previously studied. Certainly, with
time, backdoor attacks will evolve, e.g., in response to
detection techniques such as that which we propose here,
leading to an arms-race analogous to that of traditional
malware settings. However, we believe that our general
framework (that is, analyzing DNNs by probing them
with input noise) is sufficiently adaptable to significantly
contribute to this pursuit; we also expect noise-response
analysis to find future applications beyond backdoor de-
tection.
2 RELATED WORK
The sensitivity and non-robustness of DNN models to ad-
versarial environments are an emerging threat for many
problems in safety- and security-critical applications, in-
cluding medical imaging, surveillance, autonomous driv-
ing, and machine translation. The most widely stud-
ied threat scenarios can be categorized into evasion at-
tacks [38, 15], data poisoning attacks [3, 36] and back-
door attacks [16, 8]. Evasion attacks have received the
most attention and involve fooling a model into making
erroneous predictions by adding an undetectable adver-
sarial perturbation to an input image. While adversarial
examples are very effective, it is debatable whether eva-
sion attacks are a significant threat in many real-world
applications [29, 20, 43]. In particular, the effectiveness
of black-box evasion attacks is often inferior; however,
strong evasion (i.e., white-box) attacks require access to
the model, and the crafted adversarial pattern usually af-
fects only a small set of images.
On the other hand, backdoor attacks pose a realistic
threat due to the fact that it is a common practice for
research labs and government agencies to outsource the
training of DNNs and to use pre-trained 3rd-party net-
works via transfer learning [46]. This provides poten-
tial adversaries with access to machine learning pipelines
that may affect mission-critical applications.
Herein, we focus on the most common scenario of tar-
geted backdoor attacks [16, 8, 27, 28]. Let x denote an
image from class k(x) ∈ {0, . . . ,K− 1}, which we 1-hot
encode by y ∈ {0,1}K so that k(x) = argmax(y). Now,
consider a DNN classifier defined by a nonlinear transfer
function
yˆ= so f tmax(Z(x,θ)), (1)
where θ denotes edge weights and Z(x,θ) is the vector
of logits (i.e., output of the DNN before applying soft-
max). We further define kˆ(x) = argmax(yˆ) as the pre-
dicted class of x.
A DNN is said to have a targeted backdoor if there
exists a trigger ∆x∗ and a target class k∗ ∈ {0, . . . ,K−1}
such that
kˆ(x+∆x∗) = argmax(yˆ) = k∗, (2)
regardless of kˆ(x). That is, an adversary can redirect the
predicted class label for any input image to a particular
k∗ simply by adding an adversary-designed trigger ∆x∗
to that that input image. We refer to such a trigger as a
universal trigger.
2.1 Attack Strategies
There are currently numerous strategies to implement ef-
fective backdoors that achieve a nearly 100% success rate
at redirecting triggered images to the target class, while
also minimally affecting the prediction accuracy of non-
triggered images. One approach is to directly change the
weights of a pre-trained model backdoor [27]. While this
approach does not require access to the original data, it
require great deal of sophistication.
The most common approach, however, is to train a
DNN with a poisoned dataset in which some images have
the trigger and their classes are changed to the target class
k∗. Gu et el. [16] and Chen et al. [8] explore several
types of triggers (see Fig. 2), which are added to a small
number of images, which are then mixed into the training
data before training a model. Turner et al. [40] propose a
more sophisticated watermark pattern as a trigger, which
is crafted by using a GAN-based (Generative Adversarial
Network) interpolation scheme. Many more variants for
crafting triggers have been proposed [25, 24, 45, 35, 24].
2.2 Defense Strategies
Leading methods to defend against backdoors include
SentiNet [9], Activation Clustering [5], Spectral Signa-
tures [39], Fine-Pruning [26], STRIP [14], Meta Neural
Analysis [44], DeepInspect [6] and Neural Cleanse [41].
These techniques often involve three steps (detect if a
model is backdoored; identify and re-engineer the trig-
ger; and mitigate the effect of the trigger), which can im-
plemented sequentially as distinct pursuits or simultane-
ously as a single pursuit. (We adopt the prior strategy.)
A common limitation for existing defense methodolo-
gies [9, 5, 39, 26, 14, 6, 41] is that they require the train-
ing of a new model to probe the DNN under considera-
tion. This leads to very high computational overhead and
requires a certain level of expertise. In particular, Neu-
ral Cleanse [41] takes about 1.3 hours to scan a DNN.
DeepInspect [6] reduces the computational costs by a
factor of 4-10, while improving the detection rate. Never-
theless, DeepInspect requires the training of a specialized
GAN for probing, and thus the overall costs can outweigh
the training costs for the actual classifier.
Importantly, there is no previous research that rapidly
detects backdoors. Thus motivated, we now propose a
fundamentally different approach that detects backdoors
in a few seconds or less.
(a) Patch. (b) Pattern. (c) Watermark.
Figure 2: Example triggers that can be added to an image
to activate an adversarial protocol/malware that redirects
classifiers’ prediction to a target class k∗. Unlike adver-
sarial attacks, the trigger is fixed and can be applied to
any input.
3 NOISE-RESPONSE ANALYSIS
Noise-response analysis has long been a valuable tool
for studying nonlinear dynamical systems [34, 32, 11].
Leading techniques to measure the presence and extent
of chaos study the effect of noise to estimate a dynami-
cal system’s correlation dimension and largest Lyapunov
exponent [34]. The robustness of a dynamical system to
noise is also central topic with a large literature grounded
on KAM theory [11]. Such methods involve perturbation
analysis and focus on the small-noise regime, yet it is
also insightful to study larger noise intensity. More gen-
erally, one can study how a dynamical system responds
to an increasing noise intensity via a titration procedure1.
In particular, previous research [32] used similar noise-
induced titrations to identify whether black-box dynami-
cal systems were chaotic or stochastic.
We propose to use titrations and perturbation analy-
ses as complementary techniques to obtain an expres-
sive characterization for the nonlinearity of a DNN’s
transfer function, thereby allowing us to efficiently de-
tect and study backdoors. Let x = [xi jc] and Z(x,θ)
denote, respectively, the inputs and outputs (i.e., logits
before applying softmax) for a DNN with parameters
θ . We denote an entry of the logits vector Z(x,θ) by
Zk(x,θ), which gives the activation of the neuron asso-
ciated with class k. For each colored pixel xi jc, we add
i.i.d. normal-distributed noise ηi jc ∼N (0,1), which we
scale by σ > 0 so that σηi jc ∼ N (0,σ2). (The mo-
tivation for this notation will be apparent below, when
we present our perturbation theory.) Letting η = [ηi jc]
denote a tensor of noise, it follows that Zk(x+ ση ,θ)
denotes the k-th logit for a noisy image x+ ση . We
study how a DNN nonlinearly transforms an input dis-
tribution (i.e., noise) to an output distribution. For each
k ∈ {0, . . . ,K−1}, we let P(σ)k (x,z) denote the probabil-
ity of observing a logit Zk(x+ση ,θ) = z for image x
with noise variance σ2. We also allow the input images
to be sampled from some distribution, x∼ Px(x), and the
integral P(σ)k (z) =
∫
xP
(σ)
k (x,z)Px(x)dx gives the overall
distribution of Zk(x+ση ,θ) for a given σ .
3.1 Pedagogical Example
We start with an experiment to identify key insights for
how the outputs of DNNs nonlinearly respond to input
noise, which is very different for baseline and back-
doored models. In particular, input noise is amplified for
a backdoor’s target class k∗, allowing its detection. To
improve the clarity of this presentation, we focus in this
pedagogical example on a simple model (LeNet5 [23])
1In its original context, a “titration” is a procedure in chemistry
whereby one slowly adds a solution of known concentration to a so-
lution of unknown concentration. One can estimate the unknown con-
centration by noting when a reaction occurs.
and a simple dataset (MNIST-4, which we created as a
subset of MNIST [22] with characters k ∈ {0,1,2,3}).
The backdoor was implemented using the approach of
[16, 8] with a trigger ∆x∗ (in this case, a 3x3 patch of
weight-1 pixels in the lower-right corner) that was added
to 10% of the training images, redirecting their predicted
label to a target class k∗ = 0.
In Fig. 3, we present an experiment illustrating how
the distributions P(σ)k (z) differ between baseline (left col-
umn) and backdoored (right column) DNNs. We restrict
our attention to the distribution of logits Zk(x+ση ,θ)
arising for images from class k = 3 by setting Px(x) to be
a uniform distribution with compact support over images
such that k(x) = 3. In Fig. 3a, we show logit distributions
P(0)k (z) for class-3 images that are “clean” in that no trig-
gers are added to the images. The rightmost-distributions
indicate that both the baseline and backdoored DNNs
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Figure 3: Empirical distributions of the outputs, P(σ)k (z),
for baseline (left col.) and backdoored (right col.) DNNs,
which are computed across a set of class-3 images with
noise. Comparing (b) to (a): The baseline model is un-
affected by a trigger, but the backdoored model redirects
these images to the target class k∗ = 0. Comparing (d) to
(c): The baseline model is robust to noise, but the back-
doored model classifies large-noise images as k∗ (analo-
gous to the trigger’s effect).
correctly predict each image’s class, kˆ(x) = 3. In Fig. 3b,
we also show P(0)k (z), except we add the trigger ∆x
∗
to each image. The rightmost distributions in (b) show
that these triggered images are correctly classified by
the baseline model, kˆ(x+∆x∗) = 3, but the backdoored
DNN redirects their predicted labels to the target class,
kˆ(x+∆x∗) = 0. Fig. 3c and 3d depict P(σ)k (z) for σ = 1
and σ = 10, respectively. Observe that the backdoored
DNN is more strongly affected by noise than the base-
line DNN. Moreover, for the larger σ value there are log-
its Zk(x+ ση ,θ) for the target class that become very
large.
In Fig. 4, we provide another visualization for how in-
creasing σ affects the logits Zk(x+ση ,θ). We study the
same (a) baseline and (b) backdoored DNNs as in Fig. 3.
In both panels, we visualize the logits Z(x+ση ,θ)∈R4
for images x from all classes, and we project these points
onto R2 using PCA. We also randomly choose an image
from classes 1, 2, and 3, and we plot an empirical esti-
mate for E[Zk(x+ση ,θ)] =
∫
z zP
(σ)
k (z)dz while varying
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(b) Backdoored model.
Figure 4: 2D visualizations of logits using PCA. For
sample images from each class (except class k∗ = 0),
the red-to-blue paths indicate the expectations E[Zk(x+
ση ,θ)] =
∫
z zP
(σ)
k (z)dz with increasing σ . Comparing
(a) to (b): Adding noise to an image has little effect on a
baseline model, whereas for increasing σ , the predicted
classes of images are redirected toward the target class
for a backdoored model.
σ = 0 (red) to σ = 10 (blue). These paths can be inter-
preted as random walks in a low-dimensional eigenspace,
and we average over 200 such walks. Observe that the
noise has little effect for the baseline model. the tar-
get class k∗ = 0 essentially attracts predictions as σ in-
creases.
3.2 Titration Analysis
Titration analysis involves studying the dependence of a
system on a titration parameter. In our case, we study the
response of a DNN’s output to input noise with standard
deviation σ (i.e., the “titration parameter”). A common
strategy involves constructing titration curves that pro-
vide informative and expressive signals. Based on our
previous experiments, we propose to study the fraction
of noisy images x+ση whose predictions yˆ(x+ση) =
so f tmax(Z(x+ση ,θ)) are high-confidence,
T γσ -score =
|{x : ||yˆ(x+ση)||∞ > γ}|
|{x}| ∈ [0,1]. (3)
We interpret the maximum output activation, or L∞ norm,
as a notion of confidence, and we distinguish high-
and low-confidence predictions via a tunable threshold
γ ∈ [0,1). See Fig. 1a for example titration curves for
baseline and backdoored ResNets for CIFAR-10. Note
that the curves are different: for the backdoored model,
T γσ -score rapidly grows to 1 with increasing σ , whereas it
slowly grows for the baseline model. We choose the T γσ -
score to construct titration curves because Fig. 4 revealed
the targeted class k∗ to be a “sink” for the predicted labels
of noisy images. We additionally find these predictions
to have high confidence, which is a signature that we em-
pirically observe only occurs for backdoored models.
In Fig. 5, we provide a visualization to help illus-
trate why the T-score is so effective at differentiating
backdoored and baseline models; for backdoored mod-
els, noise leads to logits that are very large, which
yields high-confidence predictions. Each row in Fig. 5
shows a circle plot in which each class is represented
by a colored section of a ring. Within the circle, log-
its Zk(x+ ση ,θ) for each noisy image x+ ση is rep-
resented by a point in polar coordinates. The radius
R(x+ση) = maxk Zk(x+ση ,θ) is the maximum logit,
which we interpret as a notion of confidence. The an-
gle is given by ψkˆ(x+ση) =
kˆ
2piK , where kˆ(x+ση) is
the predicted label for noisy image x+ση and K = 10
is the number of classes. (In the plots, we additionally
add a small amount of noise to each angle ψkˆ(x+ση) so
that the points spread out and can be seen.) In each row,
we show several circle plots for increase input noise vari-
ance σ . These circle plots complement the construction
of a titration curve, which can be thought of as a scalar
summary of these plots. Note for the backdoored models
that as σ increases, the points {R(x+ση), psikˆ(x+ση)}
σ = 0.5 σ = 1.0 σ = 2.0 σ = 4.0 σ = 6.0
(a) Baseline model.
σ = 0.5
k∗
σ = 1.0
k∗
σ = 2.0
k∗
σ = 4.0
k∗
σ = 6.0
k∗
(b) Backdoor model.
Figure 5: Circle plots for baseline and backdoored versions of LeNet5 trained on MNIST. The angle ψkˆ(x+ση) ∈
[0,2pi) of each point indicates the predicted class kˆ(x+ση) of each noisy image x+ση , and the radius R(x+ση) ∈
(0,1] indicates the level of confidence (indicated by the maximum logit). As one increases the input noise intensity σ
(left to right), one observes high-confidence predictions for the target class k∗ = 3 of the backdoored model.
not only move toward the target class k∗, but the logits
become very large so that Rkˆ(x+ ση) ≈ 1 (i.e., high-
confidence) for each image. This phenomenon does not
occur for the baseline models. We point out that for a
wide range of γ and σ values, one can interpret T γσ as a
scalar measure for the risk that a DNN has a backdoor.
3.3 Perturbation Analysis
Here, we study the local sensitivity of each logit Zk(x,θ)
to each in-layer neuron, xi jc. We present a linear analy-
sis that is asymptotically consistent for the limit of small
perturbations. Consider the gradients
g(k)i jc(x) =
∂Zk(x,θ)
∂xi jc
. (4)
Fortunately, these can be efficiently computed using
the built-in automatic differentiation of modern deep-
learning software packages by defining Zk(x,θ) as a
temporary loss function. For a given perturbation ∆x,
we scale it by perturbation parameter σ ≥ 0 and Taylor
expand to obtain a first-order approximation
Zk(x+σ∆x,θ)≈ Zk(x,θ)+σ∑
i jc
g(k)i jc(x)[∆x]i jc. (5)
Let ∆Zk = Zk(x+σ∆x,θ)−Zk(x,θ) denote the change
of the k-th logit. For a perturbation with entries [∆x]i jc =
σηi jc that are drawn as i.i.d. noise with variance σ2, we
use the linearity of Eq. (4) to obtain the expectation and
variance of the first-order approximation,
E[∆Zk]≈ σ∑
i jc
g(k)i jcE[ηi jc] = 0
VAR[∆Zk] = σ2∑
i jc
(
g(k)i jc(x)
)2
. (6)
We numerically validate these results in Fig. 6, where
we compare observed and predicted values for the stan-
dard deviation, VAR[∆Zk]−1/2. Colored curves denote
empirical estimates for different values of σ , whereas the
black lines represent the prediction given by Eq. (6), i.e.,
the line has slope[
∑
i jc
(
g(k)i jc(x)
)2]−1/2
.
For sufficiently small σ , a logit’s change ∆Zk has a lin-
ear response that is well-predicted by our theory. There-
fore, the expected perturbation of each logit is zero in the
small-σ limit, regardless of the image x. This implies
(as one may have guessed) that the “sink” phenomenon
shown in Fig. 4 is strictly a nonlinear effect.
We investigate the nonlinear response of each Zk(x+
ση ,θ) to perturbations ση ∼ N (0,σ2) by construct-
ing a Taylor expansion around a noisy image x+σ∆x,
as opposed to the clean image. We obtain an approx-
imation that is nearly identical to Eq. (5), except that
one uses the gradients g(k)i jc(x+ ση) of noisy images.
If one interprets a DNN’s transfer function as a step
of a numerical ODE integrator [7], then Eq. (6) cor-
responds to an (explicit) forward Euler step, whereas
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(b) Backdoored model (WideResnet).
Figure 6: Validation of perturbation theory for CIFAR-
10. The empirical variance was computed across 1000
instances of noise, and the error bounds indicate a boot-
strap estimate.
this second approximation corresponds to an (implicit)
backward Euler step. This implicit estimate provides us
with a small-σ estimate for the distributions of logits,
P(σ)k (z)dz≈N
(
0,σ2∑i jc
(
g(k)i jc(x+ση
)2)
. However,
we are more interested in the nonlinear properties of dis-
tributions P(σ)k (z). To this end, we examine an extremal
summary statistic for P(σ)k (z),
gi j = max
k,c
g(k)i jc(x+ση). (7)
In Fig. 1b, we provide a visualization of g, which we
call an implicit gradient map. Observe that large values
provide a signal for the pixels associated with the back-
door’s trigger. In principle, one could empirically study
other distributional properties to obtain signals for the lo-
cal nonlinearity caused by backdoors.
4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
4.1 Experimental Setup
We consider several standard datasets such as
MNIST [22], CIFAR10 [21] and CIFAR100 [21],
and state-of-the-art network architectures for our exper-
imental evaluation. More concretely, we use a LeNet5
architecture [23] to train on MNIST. For CIFAR10, we
consider ResNets [19] with depth 18 and a WideResNet
[47] with depth 30 and a width factor of 4. For CI-
FAR100, we use the same WideResNet architecture as
for CIFAR10 as well as a standard PyramidNet [17] with
depth 200.
We use a small square trigger of size 3× 3 (placed at
the bottom right corner). The trigger is placed so that
the trigger success is not affected by data transformations
such as random crop. We choose the number of triggered
images so that the trigger success rate is nearly 100%,
and usually a small fraction (i.e., < 5%) of examples is
sufficient. Recall that trigger intensity refers to the nu-
merical values that are added an image’s RGB values.
That is, in order to add a trigger ∆x∗ to an image x, we
assume the trigger is binary, i.e., [∆x]i jc ∈ {0,1}, and we
train on a triggered image x+α∆x∗, where α is the trig-
ger intensity. We clip pixel intensity values that are not
within the range of the pixel values.
4.2 Experimental Evaluation
In Fig. 7, different panels depict titration curves for
the different models and datasets. All panels resem-
ble Fig. 1a in that the baseline and backdoored models
have characteristic shapes: titration curves of backdoored
models rapidly increase with σ , whereas they slowly
increase for baseline models. Interestingly, the sudden
rise in T γσ -scores for small-but-increasing σ is less pro-
nounced for the PyraMidNet trained on CIFAR-100 with
target class k∗ = 3, but not k∗ = 53 (compare Figs. 7e
and 7f). Note that there are four curves in each panel:
the light-colored curves and symbols depict T γσ -scores
when noise is added to an actual image x, whereas the
bright-colored curves and symbols are for “pure” white
noise. We observe that the T γσ -scores are nearly identi-
cal for these two approaches, but the latter approach does
not require any data. The titration curves provide us also
with guidance for choosing a advantageous σ values for
computing the T γσ -score, and moreover it can be seen that
the T γσ -score is relatively insensitive to the choice of σ .
Hence, these parameter choices can be more effectively
selected by studying the T γσ -scores for a range of σ and γ
values.
We also highlight that our approach is more efficient
than existing methods for backdoor detection [41, 6, 5].
For example, the approach proposed by [6] requires one
to train a GAN first, which is then used to probe the net-
work. Nevertheless, detecting a backdoor can take up one
hour even if a pre-trained GAN can be used.
In Table 1, we provide a summary of results for addi-
tional experiments, which highlight that a single titration
score T γσ -score suffices to accurately detect backdoored
models. The T γσ -scores were computed with pure white
noise, and our choices for σ were informed by Fig. 7.
Observe that the T γσ -score is very high (> 0.75) for most
models (with a few excepts for LeNet5 and PyramidNet,
where the T γσ -scores are large but not very large), whereas
T γσ -score is small for all of the baseline models. This ex-
tensive study provides strong evidence that the T γσ -score
is a reliable and accurate measure for a DNN’s risk for
having a backdoor.
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Figure 7: Titration curves (see Sec. 3.2) for different models and datasets illustrate a characteristic behavior: the curves
rapidly increase with σ for backdoored models, whereas they grow slowly for baseline models.
Table 1: Summary of results for different models and
datasets. The backdoored models were trained with a
3×3 patch as the trigger using different intensity α . We
compute the T-score for γ = {0.95,0.99}.
Dataset / Model Accuracy Triggerintensity
Trigger
Class
Trigger
success σ T
0.95
σ -score T
0.99
σ -score
Runtime in
seconds
MNIST
(LeNet)
99.38% - - - 4 11.14 3.8 0.4
99.38% 0.5 3 99.6% 4 65.91 55.35 0.4
99.35% 1.0 3 99.8% 4 96.55 94.25 0.4
99.36% 1.0 5 99.8% 4 96.55 95.18 0.4
99.45% 1.0 8 99.8% 4 87.55 80.83 0.4
99.42% 2.0 3 99.9% 4 72.52 60.36 0.4
CIFAR10
(ResNet)
91.34% - - - 10 18.90 0.6 0.5
91.38% 0.5 3 96.1% 10 98.5 96.3 0.5
91.36% 1.0 3 99.0% 10 99.9 99.9 0.5
91.09% 1.0 5 98.8% 10 99.9 99.9 0.5
91.09% 1.0 8 99.2% 10 93.60 89.0 0.5
91.38% 2.0 3 100% 10 98.5 96.3 0.5
CIFAR10
(WideResNet)
95.46% - - - 30 0.4 0.0 0.9
95.03% 0.5 3 98.1% 30 99.9 99.9 0.9
95.19% 1.0 3 99.8% 30 99.9 99.9 0.9
95.35% 1.0 5 99.8% 30 97.1 99.1 0.9
95.09% 1.0 8 99.9% 30 96.0 77.2 0.9
95.22% 2.0 3 100% 30 99.9 99.9 0.9
CIFAR100
(WideResNet)
78.54% - - - 100 0.0 0.0 1.1
77.67% 1.0 3 99.8% 100 98.8 96.8 1.1
78.12% 1.0 53 99.7% 100 99.9 99.9 1.1
CIFAR100
(PyramidNet)
80.17% - - - 6 0.3 0.1 1.9
79.72% 1.0 3 99.8% 6 43.6 36.8 1.9
79.88% 1.0 28 99.8% 6 99.9 99.9 1.9
80.85% 1.0 53 99.8% 6 99.9 99.9 1.9
For the examples considered, we achieve high titration
scores for all backdoored models, except for when k∗ = 3
for the backdoored PyramidNet. However, from a visual
analysis of the titration curves (see Fig. 7e), it becomes
apparent that this model is backdoored. That is, because
it can be seen that the titration curve of the backdoored
model is rapidly increasing for increased titration levels
σ , i.e., the level of noise. This characteristic behavior of
the backdoored model to noise is even more pronounced
for the other titration curves.
Table 2: Summary of results for backdoored models
trained with a watermark trigger using different intensity
levels α .
Dataset / Model Accuracy Triggerintensity
Trigger
Class
Trigger
success σ T
0.95
σ -score T
0.99
σ -score
Runtime in
seconds
MNIST
(LeNet)
99.38% - - - 4 11.14 3.8 0.4
99.42% 0.5 3 100% 4 100 100 0.4
99.47% 1.0 3 100% 4 100 100 0.4
99.38% 1.0 5 100% 4 100 100 0.4
99.52% 1.0 8 100% 4 100 100 0.4
99.54% 2.0 3 100% 3 100 100 0.4
CIFAR10
(ResNet)
91.34% - - - 10 18.90 0.6 0.5
90.13% 0.5 3 82.3% 10 100 100 0.5
90.36% 1.0 3 84.5% 10 100 100 0.5
90.13% 1.0 5 83.3% 10 100 100 0.5
90.23% 1.0 8 82.8% 10 100 100 0.5
90.40% 2.0 3 83.7% 10 100 100 0.5
CIFAR10
(WideResNet)
95.46% - - - 30 0.4 0.0 0.9
94.61% 0.5 3 97.2% 30 100 100 0.9
94.24% 1.0 3 98.9% 30 100 100 0.9
94.47% 1.0 5 99.5% 30 100 100 0.9
94.52% 1.0 8 98.8% 30 100 100 0.9
94.70% 2.0 3 100% 30 100 100 0.9
In Table 2, we present additional results that show
titration analyses robustly detect backdoored models
trained with watermarks for a variety of DNN architec-
tures, datasets and trigger intensities. Note that we have
chosen values for ω and γ in which the titration score
(T-score) clearly differentiates models with and without
backdoors. To select appropriate parameter choices, we
consider titration curves (as described above).
4.3 Ablation Study
In Fig. 8, we more deeply study the effect of trigger in-
tensity on backdoored versions of a (a) LeNet5 and (b)
ResNet, which are respectively trained on MNIST and
CIFAR10. The solid blue curves shows the trigger suc-
cess rate (i.e., the percentage of images that, upon adding
the trigger ∆x∗, have a predicted class kˆ(x+α∆x∗) that
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Figure 8: We evaluate the relationship between trigger
intensity α and success rate, as well as the titration score
T γσ . The results show that triggers with larger α have a
higher success rate. Moreover, T γσ appears to be high for
any backdoored model in which the trigger is successful.
is redirected to the target class, k∗) versus trigger inten-
sity α . Note that if α is too small, then the triggers don’t
work. In other words, the models essentially do not have
backdoors because the triggers do not redirect predic-
tions to the target class. Interestingly, this “failure” in
trigger success rate drops steeply and is reminiscent of
a phase transition. (We note that here, we have held the
number of triggered examples to be fixed. In general, one
would expect the trigger success rate to also improve as
one increases the number of triggered images for train-
ing.) The green dotted curves in Fig. 8 depict titration
scores T γσ for backdoored models trained with different
trigger intensity α . The values of γ and σ are identical
to those in Table 1. Observe that it also appears to un-
dergo a phase transition which mirrors that of the trigger
success.
In summary, provided that a backdoored model has
a functioning trigger (i.e., there is actually a backdoor),
then it can be detected by titration analysis.
5 DISCUSSION
We adopted a dynamical-systems perspective for ma-
chine learning [42, 30, 18, 31], using techniques from
noise response analysis, to develop an efficient and ac-
curate method to detect whether or not a DNN has been
trained by an adversary to have a backdoor. More con-
cretely, we studied the response of a DNN to an input
signal, which is a common technique to explore the non-
linearity of dynamical systems with unknown properties
[34, 32]. For linear, time-invariant systems of ODEs, one
typically looks to input signals that are an impulse or
step function for “black-box” learning of unknown trans-
fer functions [37]. DNNs are, of course, highly nonlin-
ear, requiring a different type of input signal: noise. We
proposed noise-response analysis as an invaluable tool
for analyzing backdoors and presented methods that re-
quire seconds to compute, which is remarkably efficient
given that existing state-of-the-art methods require hours
[6, 41]. Given that noise-response analysis relies on
studying the local and global nonlinearity of DNNs using
input noise, we expect our approach to also be fruitful for
other topics in DNNs and machine learning.
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